We study the complexity of priced control in elections. Naturally, if a given control type is NP-hard for a given voting system E then its priced variant is NP-hard for this rule as well. It is, however, interesting what effect introducing prices has on the complexity of those control problems that without prices are tractable. We show that for four prominent voting rules (plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland) introducing prices does not increase the complexity of control by adding/deleting candidates/voters. However, we do show an example of a scoring rule for which such an effect takes place.
Introduction
We consider the complexity of election control [2, 32] for the case where different control actions can have possibly different prices. Our main motivation comes from the fact that different types of control actions allowed in multimode control reflect a wide range of ways in which elections can be influenced through political campaigns, and prices reflect the fact that the cost of different actions varies. Our main finding is that introducing prices in control problems, typically, does not change their complexity. Specifically, we show that for several well-known voting rules (plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland) the complexity of control problems with prices remains the same as for the unpriced variants (however, showing this requires more care). On the other hand, we show that for scoring protocols may be more expensive than convincing others (e.g., because for some we would have to pay for their transportation to the voting stations, whereas for others we would simply have to drop some leaflets in their neighborhood). Thus, in this paper we extend the model of control introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick by allowing that different control actions have different prices. To simplify and shorten many of our proofs, we apply the multimode control framework of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22] .
Related work
Computational study of election control was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] , who defined the problems of constructive election control by adding/deleting/partitioning candidates or voters for plurality and Condorcet elections. Later Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [32] extended their work by considering destructive variants of these problems, and by also studying the approval voting rule. Since these two papers, many researchers studied the complexity of control problems for various voting rules and in various other models. For example, Faliszewski et al. [24] considered the Copeland rule, Erdélyi et al. [18] studied Bucklin and fallback rules, and Parkes and Xia [44] studied the Schulze rule. This list, of course, is not exhaustive and is meant to present just a few examples (the reader may wish to consult the survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra for some more details [21] ).
In addition to studying election control for different voting rules, researchers extended the standard model of election control in many different directions. For example, Meir et al. [42] studied election control in multiwinner voting and introduced a model that generalizes the idea of constructive and destructive control. Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22] studied multimode control, where it is possible to perform several different types of control actions at the same time (e.g., it is possible to add some candidates, and delete some voters; the standard control problems allow one to either only add candidates or only delete voters, etc.). Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] were the first to study control in weighted elections (however the work of Baumeister et al. [5] is related to this topic). Other authors took a different perspective and, for example, studied parametrized complexity of control problems [6, 36, 37, 50] , or considered the complexity of control in elections where votes come from some restricted domains (e.g., the singlepeaked domain [8, 25] or the single-crossing domain [38] ). On the other hand, Wojtas and Faliszewski [48] studied counting variants of control problems, where instead of asking if someone can become a winner we ask for the probability that someone becomes a winner, given that a random control action is taken. This counting variant of control can be used to predict election winners and, thus, has similar applications as the research presented in this paper; it aims to guide the election campaigning process. Recently, Bulteau et al. [11] and Chen et al. [12] considered combinatorial control, where adding each candidate or voter may result in adding some other ones as well. This variant of control also is useful from the point of view of campaign management. After all, if one convinces some person to join the election (either as a candidate or as a voter), this person might convince some more people.
While traditionally election control problems are limited to adding/deleting/partitioning candidates and voters, there are many problems that are very close in spirit to election control. For example, Chevaleyre et al. [13] studied a different setting where new candidates can appear, and Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [17] studied candidate cloning. Research on election control has also affected research on related fields. For example, Baumeister et al. [3] studied control in judgment aggregation.
Our contribution to the computational study of control is to consider priced variants of control problems. Yet, the idea of studying priced variants of election problems has appeared earlier and is due to Faliszewski et al. [20] , who introduced the problem of bribery in elections. In the bribery problem, we are given an election where each voter v has some price (v), and we have available budget B. Upon paying the voter his or her price, we can change the voter's vote as we like. The question is if it is possible to ensure a given preferred candidate's victory without exceeding the available budget. Many algorithmic ideas of Faliszewski et al. [20] are useful in our setting as well. Bribery was later studied by various researchers [8, 22, 24, 39, 49] , sometimes in settings other than those regarding elections [3, 40, 45] (these references are meant as examples only, see the survey of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [21] for some more discussion). In particular, Faliszewski [19] and Elkind et al. [15, 16] introduced the idea of voter prices that depend on the extent to which a given vote is affected. Among other motivations, they thought of using the bribery framework to model campaign management problems: A campaign manager working for some candidate can spend some effort on a particular voter to affect his or her preference order, but more significant changes require more effort than the less significant ones. Our view of modeling campaign management through priced control problems is inspired by these works on bribery. Bribery problems with prices dependent on the extent of the bribery were later studied by various other researchers [4, 9, 14, 41] , also in the setting where a single bribery action can affect multiple voters [10] .
Results
Given the above, very rough, overview of the literature on the complexity of election control, we see that there are three main lines of research regarding the topic. First, researchers seek complexity results for more and more different voting rules. Second, researchers seek to extend the election control model (e.g., by introducing weights, studying restricted domains, generalizing the notions of constructive/destructive control actions). Third, researchers apply the ideas from election control in other settings (e.g., in judgment aggregation).
Our paper follows the second line of research: We extend the model of election control by assuming that different control actions have possibly different costs. We focus on plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting rules, but we also include some other ones (e.g., Copeland and certain scoring protocols). We show that for each of these rules the complexity of control by adding/deleting candidates or voters is the same irrespective if we assume that all control actions have the same or possibly different costs. This result, however, is not trivial. Of course hardness proofs for the unit-cost model translate directly to hardness results in the model with varying costs, but easiness results do not. Indeed, sometimes we have to replace very simple greedy algorithms with more involved ones, sometimes using dynamic programming. We summarize our results in Table 1 .
Our results for plurality, Condorcet, approval, and Copeland yield the question if adding prices can ever increase the complexity of control problems? We give an affirmative answer by showing a scoring protocol for which destructive voter control is easy, but for which destructive priced voter control is hard. This result answers our question, but leaves a bit more to be desired: Is there a natural voting rule with such a property? We leave this as an open problem.
The current paper, in some sense, complements that of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] regarding the complexity of control in weighted elections. However, our results are very different. They show that adding weights to control problems often increases the complexity of control, whereas this is not the case for adding prices. They 
show that destructive weighted voter control under scoring protocols is always easy, whereas we show that destructive priced voter control can sometimes be NP-hard (however, see the discussions in Section 5 for a possible explanation of this difference).
Preliminaries
In this section we review the voting rules that we study and formally define (priced) election control problems.
Elections and Election
Rules. An election E = (C, V ) consists of a set of candidates C = {c 1 , . . . , c m } and a set of voters V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. (However, occasionally in our algorithms we will treat C and V as lists rather than sets. In such cases either the orders of the candidates/voters on the lists will be irrelevant or will be clearly specified.) Each voter is associated with this voter's preferences. The preferences are represented as strict total orders over the set of candidates. An election rule (voting rule, election system, voting system) E is a function which given an election E = (C, V ) maps it to the set of winners E(E) ⊆ C. In this paper we focus on polynomial-time computable voting rules but, in general, determining election winners can be a much more computationally demanding problem. 1 There can be more than one winner of an election. In such situations, to emphasize this fact, we refer to the winners of the election as the nonunique winners. Similarly, if there is only one winner of an election we refer to him or her as the unique winner. Finally, we allow situations where an election has no winners.
There are many different voting rules. For example, under the plurality rule we give a point to each candidate that is ranked first, and choose as winners those candidates that have the highest number of points. More generally, a scoring rule is defined through a family of scoring vectors, one for each candidate-set cardinality, that define how many points a candidate receives for being ranked at a given position by a voter. Formally, a scoring vector (for an m-candidate election) is an m-tuple α = α 1 , . . . , α m of nonnegative integers given in nonincreasing order. For each vote where a candidate is ranked i'th, the candidate receives α i points. The candidates that have the highest number of points are the winners. For example, plurality is defined through a family of scoring vectors of the form 1, 0, . . . , 0 . Other interesting scoring protocols include, e.g., the veto rule (defined through vectors of the form 1, . . . , 1, 0 ), the k-approval rule (defined through vectors that start with k ones and then continue with zeros), the k-veto rule (defined through vectors that end with k zeros, preceded by ones), and the Borda rule (defined through vectors of the form m − 1, m − 2, . . . , 0 ).
In the Condorcet method, a candidate c is a winner if he or she beats all the other candidates in head-to-head contests (i.e., if
It is possible that there is no winner under Condorcet rule, but if there is one, he or she is unique.
The Copeland rule is an extension of the Condorcet rule in the sense that it elects the Condorcet winner whenever it exists, and otherwise picks those candidates that are closest to being Condorcet winners in a certain way. Formally, for each rational α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, in the Copeland α voting rule, candidate c receives one point for each candidate
Candidates with the highest number of points are the winners. Naturally, there are many other rules that can be seen as extensions of the Condorcet rule (for example, the maximin rule, the Young rule, the Kemeny rule, the Dodgson rule; see, e.g., the overview of Brams and Fishburn [7] ). However, among this type of rules, in this paper we focus on the Copeland rule.
Finally, we also consider the approval voting rule. Under approval, voters' preferences are represented differently. Instead of ranking the candidates, each voter provides a set of candidates that he or she approves of. A candidate receives a point for each voter that approves of him or her. As before, the candidates with the highest number of points are the winners.
We denote the score of a candidate c in election E by score E (c) (the actual voting rule will always be clear from the context). When the election E is clear from the context, we sometimes write score(c) instead of score E (c). Further, for an election E = (C, V ) and candidates c, d ∈ C, we write diff E (c, d) to mean the difference between the score of candidate c and the score of candidate d. For the case of the Condorcet rule, by diff
Election Control Problems. We consider priced multimode control problems. In control problems an attacker tries to execute a basic control action such as candidate addition, candidate deletion, voter addition, or voter deletion to change the result of an election. In priced multimode control problems several different types of basic control actions can be combined into a single attack. Moreover, each such action has associated price and the person exercising control over the election has a limited budget.
We assume that there is a price tag for each voter and candidate that we add or delete. That is, for each voter v that can be added or deleted, we have a nonnegative integer (v), the price of adding/deleting v. For each candidate c that can be added or deleted, we have a nonnegative integer (c), the price of adding/deleting c. To simplify notation, if we consider, e.g., some set W of voters, we write (W ) to mean v∈W (v) . We use analogous notation for candidate sets. Unless stated otherwise, we assume that the prices are encoded in binary.
With this notation available, we define the most general form of our control problem.
Name: constructive/destructive E-AC+DC+AV+DV-priced-control. 
This definition calls for some comments. We note that subset C is the set of candidates to be removed from the election and subset D is the set of candidates to be added to the election. Analogously, V is the set of deleted voters and W is the set of added voters. The total price of such a control action is the sum of the prices of added/deleted candidates and voters. That is, the total price is
For the case where all the prices are equal to one, we refer to the above problem as E-AC+DC+AV+DV-control (omitting the word "priced").
We point out that even though we follow the idea of multimode control of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22] , we slightly differ from their approach. Indeed, they have a separate "budget" for each control type, whereas we have a single parameter K that models the total budget. This matches our motivating example of campaign management better. If one is running a campaign, there is a single budget that can be partitioned between various activities in any convenient way.
We use the unique-winner model. That is, to be successful, a candidate has to be the only winner of the election. Both the unique-winner model and the nonunique-winner model are frequently studied in election control literature. While occasionally the choice of the particular model matters heavily, this is not the case for this work. Nonetheless, for some of our results we cite papers that focus on the unique winner model and, thus, it is more convenient for us to focus on this model as well.
In the constructive cases, we will often speak of the distinguished candidate c as the preferred candidate and thus we will often denote him or her with p rather than with c. For the destructive cases, we will refer to this candidate as the despised one and often use d to denote him or her.
We are often interested in subproblems of E-AC+DC+AV+DV-priced-control where only some nonempty subset of basic control actions, AC (adding candidates), DC (deleting candidates), AV (adding voters), and DV (deleting voters), is available. We denote such subproblems by leaving only relevant parts of the input and appropriately modifying the question part of the problem. (Intuitively, one could also think that all the disallowed control actions have prices higher than the available budget.) Names of such control problems are formed from the name of the voting system E, followed by the permitted basic control actions, where all parts are separated with the "+" character. For example, if we studied priced control by adding candidates and deleting voters, then the problem's name would be E-AC+DV-priced-control.
We say that a voting system is susceptible to constructive control problem C if for some instance of this control problem with an election E, a preferred candidate is not a unique winner of the election E, but it is possible to exercise control C over election E in such a way as to make the preferred candidate the unique winner. Similarly, in the case of destructive control, a voting system is susceptible to control if we can prevent the despised candidate from being the unique winner (and he or she had not been the unique winner before). A voting system is said to be immune to control if it is not susceptible to it. If a voting system is susceptible to control and the associated decision problem is in P, then we say that the voting system is vulnerable to this type of control. If a voting system is susceptible to control and the associated decision problem is NP-hard, we say it is resistant to this type of control.
The main goal of this paper is to establish the complexity of priced control by adding or deleting candidates or voters for the plurality rule, the approval rule, the Condorcet rule, and the Copeland rule. We focus on the problems where only a single type of control is allowed, but we use the expressive power of multimode control to simplify and compress our proofs.
Computational Complexity. We assume that the reader is familiar with basic notions of complexity theory such as classes P and NP, polynomial-time many-one reductions, and the notions of NP-hardness and NP-completeness (see, e.g., the textbook of Papadimitriou [43] ). However, most of the proofs in this paper present polynomial-time algorithms.
Sometimes prices do not affect the complexity of control
In this section we study priced control under the plurality, approval, Condorcet and Copeland rules, using the multimode control framework. Naturally, introducing prices cannot make our control problems easier and, indeed, the following easy proposition holds.
Proposition 3.1 For each voting rule E and each control type C, it holds that constructive (destructive) E-C-control polynomial-time many-one reduces to constructive (destructive) E-C-priced-control.
Proof Given an instance of constructive (destructive) E-C-control, we output an instance of E-C-priced-control that is identical except that, in addition, all the candidates/voters that can be added/deleted are associated with the same unit price.
Thus all the hardness results for the unpriced control problems hold in the priced setting. The main message of this section is that all the existing vulnerability results for adding/deleting candidates or voters for our four voting rules do carry through to the setting with prices as well. In particular, we show that plurality is vulnerable to constructive and destructive AV+DV-priced-control, approval and Condorcet are vulnerable to destructive AC+AV+DV-priced-control and to constructive DC-priced-control, and Copeland is vulnerable to destructive AC+DC-priced-control. Is it the case that adding prices never increases the complexity of control problems? In Section 4 we show that there are scoring protocols for which considering prices does make a difference in terms of the complexity of control problems.
In the following sections we present our results for the plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland rules. We remark that we phrase our results in full generality, using the multimode control framework. However, of course, our results that regard several control types at the same time carry through to settings with fewer control types. For example, the fact that the Condorcet rule is vulnerable to destructive AC+AV+DV-priced-control means that it is also vulnerable to destructive variants of each of AC-priced-control, AV-priced-control, and DV-priced-control (this follows naturally from the definition because we can set up the prices for the disallowed control actions to be above the allowed budget; a very similar result is given as Proposition 4.9 by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22] ).
Plurality rule
We start by considering the plurality rule. Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] have shown that plurality is resistant to constructive control by adding/deleting candidates, but that it is vulnerable to constructive control by adding/deleting voters. Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [32] have shown that the same results hold for the destructive variants of these problems. We extend the vulnerability results to the priced case by showing that Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control is in P both in the constructive and in the destructive case (for the case without prices, this has already been done by Faliszewski et al. [22] ).
Plurality is a very simple rule. If a new vote is added to the election, then the score of the candidate who is ranked first in this vote is increased by one, while the scores of all the other candidates remain intact. Similarly, when deleting a single vote from the election, only the score of one candidate is affected. This locality property makes it possible to construct greedy algorithms for Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control. Our algorithms are natural extensions of those for the unpriced setting.
Theorem 3.2 Constructive Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control is in P.
Proof Input to the constructive Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control problem consists of an election E = (C, V ), a preferred candidate p ∈ C, a set of additional voters W , a list of prices associated with the voters from V ∪ W , and a natural number K (the available budget). We give a greedy algorithm which in each step decreases the value of max c∈C\{p} diff E (c, p) by one, and halts either when we make p the unique winner of the election, or the available budget is exceeded, or there are no more votes to add/remove.
Our algorithm proceeds as follows. If p is already the unique winner, then accept. Otherwise keep executing one of the following actions, until either p becomes the unique winner (and then accept), there are no more actions that can be executed (and then reject), or we exceed the budget (and then reject). There are two possible actions, the one with lower cost is selected and executed:
1. From the set of additional votes that rank p first, pick a vote w which has not been added to the election yet and which has minimal price (w). The cost of this action is (w). If this action is executed, add w to the election. 2. For each candidate c in arg max c∈C diff E (c, p), pick a vote v ∈ V that ranks c first, that has not already been deleted from the election, and that has minimal price among such votes. Let U be the collection of the picked votes. The cost of this action is (U ). If this action is executed, all the votes from U are deleted from the election.
The algorithm's pseudocode is presented on Fig. 1 . The correctness is straightforward to see, and it is also easy to see that it runs in polynomial time. Let N be the total number of voters in V and W . The while-loop in the algorithm executes at most O(N) times (because in every iteration p decreases the difference between its score and the score of the current election winners by one; in the worst case p initially has score 0 and the original election winners have score N ). Each iteration requires polynomial time to compute w and U (a single linear scan through V and W suffices to achieve this, provided that throughout the execution of the algorithm we maintain the scores of those candidates who are ranked first by at least one voter each).
In constructive Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control we have to ensure that the preferred candidate's score is higher than the scores of all the remaining candidates. On the other hand, in destructive control we only have to ensure that there exists at least one candidate with score equal to or higher than the score of the despised candidate. This suggests a simple algorithm enumerating all candidates and checking if one of them can beat or tie the despised one. As before, this is a natural extension of the algorithms for the unpriced setting.
Theorem 3.3 Destructive plurality-AV+DV-priced-control is in P.
Proof Input to the destructive Plurality-AV+DV-priced-control instance consists of an election E = (C, V ), a despised candidate d ∈ C, a set of additional voters W , a list of prices associated with voters V ∪ W , and an available budget K ∈ N. For each candidate c ∈ C \ {d} we create a list of votes from V where d is ranked first, which we could delete from the election, and a list of votes in W where c is ranked first, which we could add to the election. We merge these lists together, sort them in the order of increasing prices, and take up to the first max(0, diff E (d, c) ) votes, i.e., the number of votes that creates a tie between candidate d and candidate c. If there are sufficiently many votes and their total price does not exceed the available budget K, then we accept. Otherwise if this condition is not fulfilled for any candidate c ∈ C \ {d}, we reject. Pseudocode for this algorithm is presented on Fig. 2 . It is straightforward to see that the algorithm runs in polynomial time; for each candidate c one has to perform a simple set of polynomial-time operations. Thus, for the case of plurality, introducing prices is seamless; we can adjust the existing greedy algorithms in a simple way. We believe that this is a very positive result. Priced control problems are more realistic and it is convenient that considering prices comes at essentially no additional cost in terms of computational complexity.
Approval and condorcet rules
Let us now move on to the case of approval and Condorcet. We extend the results of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra and Hemaspaandra [22] (who themselves relied on the results of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] and Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [32] ), who have shown that the approval and Condorcet rules are vulnerable to destructive AC+AV+DV-control, to apply to priced control. We show that approval and Condorcet are vulnerable to destructive AC+AV+DV-priced-control as well. We do not consider destructive priced control by deleting candidates because approval and Condorcet are immune to this type of control (and adding prices makes no difference with respect to immunity). On the other hand, we show that approval and Condorcet are vulnerable to constructive DC-priced-control. Naturally, through Proposition 3.1 and the results of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] and Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [32] , approval and Condorcet are resistant to constructive voter priced control problems, and are immune to constructive priced control by adding candidates.
The reader may wonder why we consider the approval and Condorcet rules jointly. The reason is that both approval elections and Condorcet elections can be understood in terms of the results of head-to-head contests between candidates. By head-to-head contests we mean elections where only two candidates are present. To facilitate this approach we adopt the following convention: we say that candidate c is preferred to candidate d in an election with voter set V if and only if diff With this notation available, we see that a candidate is the unique winner of an approval election or of a Condorcet election if and only if he or she is the unique winner of all the head-to-head contests with the other candidates. Thus to prevent a despised candidate d from being a unique winner, we have to ensure that another candidate beats or ties the despised candidate in their head-to-head contest. The despised candidate's loss to some candidate c can be achieved by introducing voters who prefer c to d, or by deleting voters who prefer d to c. Each such added or deleted voter introduces the same change in the score difference (difference in number of approvals) between candidate c and the despised candidate. This observation suggest a simple algorithm based on enumeration of candidates who might ensure the despised candidate's defeat, combined with a greedy approach to selecting the votes relevant to the head-to-head contest with the despised candidate. Proof In a destructive AC+AV+DV-priced-control instance we are given an election E = (C, V ), a despised candidate d ∈ C, a set of additional candidates D, a set of additional voters W , prices associated with the candidates in D and the voters in V ∪ W , and an available budget K ∈ N.
If candidate d already is not a unique winner of election E then control is successful and we accept. Otherwise, for each candidate c ∈ (C ∪ D) \ {d}, we create a list L containing those voters from V , where d is preferred to c, and those voters from W , where c is preferred to d. We sort L in the order of increasing prices, and limit it to the first up to diff E (d, c) votes. In our control action we delete the votes from V that are in L, and add the votes from W that are in L. Therefore the total price of control action is the sum over:
1. The prices associated with the voters added to and removed from the election. If there are enough votes to create a tie between candidate c and candidate d, and the total cost does not exceed K, accept. Otherwise, repeat this procedure for all the remaining candidates. If control is not possible for any candidate c ∈ (C ∪ D) \ {d}, reject. The final algorithm is presented on Fig. 3 .
The algorithm runs in polynomial time. The outer loop is executed at most O( C ) times and each iteration is easily seen to be polynomial-time computable.
In the constructive setting, approval and Condorcet are vulnerable to control by deleting candidates only. (They are immune to control by adding candidates and resistant to voter control [2, 32] .) We extend this result to the priced setting. Clearly, to make the preferred candidate win, all the candidates that defeat him or her in their head-to-head contest should be deleted. Furthermore, as deleting candidates does not affect in any way the results of head-to-head contests, it is a necessary and sufficient condition. There is a single optimal control action.
Theorem 3.5 Approval voting and Condorcet voting are vulnerable to constructive DCpriced-control.
Proof In constructive DC-priced-control instance we are given an election E = (C, V ), a preferred candidate p ∈ C, a list of prices associated with the candidates in C, and an available budget K. Candidate p is the unique winner of the election E if and only if he or she beats all remaining candidates in their head-to-head contests. Therefore, if the total price necessary to delete all the candidates who tie or beat the preferred candidate p in their head-to-head contests is within budget, then accept, otherwise reject. Pseudocode is presented in Fig. 4 . The algorithm runs in polynomial time; computing diff E (p, c) requires Again, introducing prices does not make the control problems significantly harder for the approval and Condorcet rules. It is easy and natural to extend existing greedy algorithms to take prices into account. As we will see in the next section, the case of Copeland is somewhat more involved.
Copeland rule
Faliszewski et al. [24] have studied Llull and Copeland voting rules and have shown that Copeland α fully resists constructive control, resists destructive AV and DV control, but is vulnerable to both destructive AC and DC control. These vulnerability results have been combined into destructive AC+DC control vulnerability by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22] . Here we extend this result to the priced control framework.
In the following theorem we extend the algorithm of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [22, Theorem 4.10] to the case of destructive AC+DC-priced-control, for the case of Copeland 0 and Copeland 1 rules. Then we explain why it does not work for Copeland α for all rational α values, α, 0 < α < 1. Finally, in Theorem 3.8, we provide an algorithm which does work for all rational values of α. Proof In a destructive Copeland α -AC+DC-priced-control instance, where α is in {0, 1}, we are given an election E = (C, V ), a despised candidate d ∈ C, a set of additional candidates D, a list of prices associated with the candidates in C ∪ D, and an available budget K ∈ N. To preclude despised candidate d from being the unique winner of the election, we need to ensure that the score of another candidate from C ∪ D, call him or her p (we try each possible choice of p), is higher or equal to the score of d, i.e., diff E (d, p) ≤ 0. The score of a candidate in a Copeland α election is the sum of his or her scores in head-to-head contents with the remaining candidates:
d},V ) (c).
For each candidate c, define gain p,d (c) to be the score difference that candidate p gains relative to the despised candidate d, if candidate c is part of the control action (assuming that p participates in the election):
It is easy to see that for Copeland 0 and Copeland 1 , for each candidate c, The above algorithm relies on the fact that all the candidates that we add or remove from the election introduce the same score difference between the despised candidate and our chosen candidate p. This is a crucial element ensuring correctness of the greedy approach. In Copeland α for some rational α, 0 < α < 1, the score difference could be 1, α or 1 − α. This makes the candidates incomparable and this greedy approach infeasible.
To facilitate our dynamic programming solution, we reformulate Copeland α into voting system Copeland x,y N that admits only natural numbers as scores.
Definition 3.7 Let x, y be two nonnegative integers. We define voting rule Copeland
x,y N as follows. Given an election E = (C, V ), each candidate c receives the following score:
The candidates with the highest score are the winners. . . , a n } and define m(i, g) to be the minimal price of a control action necessary to achieve a total gain (as defined in the previous proof) of at least g by adding/deleting candidates from the set {a 1 , . . . , a i } only. It is easy to see that the following recursive relation holds:
Indeed, m(0, g) is the price of achieving gain g without adding or deleting candidates and, so, m(0, g) = 0 if g = 0 and m(0, g) = ∞ otherwise. Now, the value m(i, g) for i > 0 can be computed as follows: To achieve gain g by adding/deleting candidates from the set {a 1 E (d, p) 
Let us now argue that the algorithm runs in polynomial time. Computing the scores of all the candidates and all the necessary gain values requires a scan over every vote, for every pair of candidates. For a given choice of p, computing the m(i, g) values also requires a polynomial number of steps. This is so because the values of i are between 0 and C ∪ D and the maximum value of g that we may need to consider is C ∪ D max(x, y) . Using standard dynamic-programming techniques we can compute all the m(i, g) values in polynomial time. Finally, there are polynomially many choices of p.
Corollary 3.9 For each rational
Proof For each rational α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, this follows directly from Theorem 3.8.
The above discussion shows that algorithms for priced control are not always simple extensions of those for the unpriced cases, and indeed can require new ideas. In the next section we show that it is possible that introducing prices moves control problems from being solvable in polynomial time to being NP-hard.
Prices can increase the complexity of control
In the previous section, we have shown that for several prominent voting rules introducing prices does not affect the complexities of our control problems. Now we will show that, nonetheless, there are rules for which it is not the case. First, we show that destructive AVpriced-control and DV-priced-control problems are polynomial-time solvable for scoring rules, provided that either the prices or the entries of the used scoring vectors are encoded in unary. 2 In particular, it means that for every scoring protocol, destructive control by adding/deleting voters (without prices) is in P. Second, we show an example of a scoring protocol, whose entries are encoded in binary, for which destructive AV-priced-control and DV-priced-control problems are NP-hard.
It is interesting to compare our results to those of Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] regarding control problems in weighted elections. While they mostly consider constructive cases, they remark that destructive voter control for scoring protocols in weighted elections is in P (in weighted elections for each voter v there is a natural number w v , his or her weight, and we treat the vote of v as if it were cast by w v voters with the same preference order). Our results show that the complexity of destructive voter control for the case of priced elections behaves in much more intricate ways.
Vulnerability results
We first provide our vulnerability results. To simplify the proofs, we define the following head-to-head priced control problem in which we ask if some specific candidate can tie or beat the despised candidate by adding voters to the election. Name: Scoring head-to-head priced control. Given: An election (C, V ), a scoring vector α = α 1 , . . . , α C , a despised candidate d ∈ C, a preferred candidate p ∈ C distinct from d, a set of additional voters W , a list of natural numbers describing prices associated with voters W , and available budget
In scoring head-to-head priced control, candidates' scores in the election are calculated using a given scoring vector α.
Lemma 4.1 Scoring head-to-head priced control is in P if scoring vectors entries are represented in unary.
Proof In scoring head-to-head priced control we are given an election E = (C, V ), a scoring vector α, a despised candidate d, a preferred candidate p ∈ C \ {d}, a set of additional voters W with their prices , and available budget K ∈ N. We assume that diff E (d, p) > 0; otherwise the problem is trivial. Define gain E (v) to be diff (C,{v}) (p, d) , i.e., the score difference that p gains relative to d if we add voter v to the election E. We observe that it is of no use to add voters with nonpositive gain if we try to increase the score difference between p and d. Let W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } be the set of voters from W with positive gain. Let m(i, g) be the minimal price of a control action necessary to achieve a total gain (summed over all votes we decided to add) equal to or higher than g, using the first i voters from W . If it is not possible to achieve such gain, define m(i, g) to be infinite. The value m(i, g) can be computed using the following recursive definition:
(The explanation and justification of this function is, in essence, the same as for the analogous function in the proof of Theorem 3.8, but considering the voters instead of the candidates.) Candidate p can tie or beat d if and only if m( W , diff E (d, p) ) ≤ K. This completes the description of the algorithm.
The algorithm runs in polynomial time. Computing all the scores and all the gain values requires a single scan over the whole profile (and the votes that can be added). Computing all the necessary m(i, g) values, using standard dynamic-programming techniques, also requires only polynomially many steps because there are O( W ) choices of i and O(α 1 W ) choices of g, where α 1 is the number of points that our scoring protocol assigns to the top-ranked candidate (recall that we have assumed the scoring protocol to be encoded in unary).
Lemma 4.2 Scoring head-to-head priced control is in P if prices are represented in unary.
Proof We give a proof similar in spirit to the proof of Lemma 4.1. In scoring head-tohead priced control we are given an election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate d, a preferred candidate p ∈ C \{d}, a set of additional voters W and their prices . Assume that diff E (d, p) > 0; otherwise the problem is trivial. Define gain E (v) to be the score difference that p gains relative to d if we add voter v to the election E. Let W = {w 1 , . . . , w n } be the set of voters from W with positive gain . Let g(i, π) be the maximal total gain, summed over all votes we decided to add, that can be achieved, using first i votes from W with total price of control not exceeding π . The value g(i, π) can be computed using the following recursive formulation: Proof In the destructive AV-priced-control problem we are given an election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate d ∈ C, a set of additional voters W with their prices , and available budget K ∈ N. If the despised candidate d is already not a unique winner of election E then accept. Otherwise check using the procedure from Lemma 4.1 (when the scoring vector entries are represented in unary) or Lemma 4.2 (when the prices are represented in unary) if there exists a candidate p ∈ C \ {d} such that p can tie or beat candidate d after addition of some voters from W , within available budget K, and accept or reject accordingly. This requires at most C − 1 executions of algorithms from the mentioned theorems, therefore this procedure runs in polynomial time.
The same approach can be used in the case of destructive control by deleting voters. No significant changes to the above proofs are required. It is simply a matter of updating the definition of gain to reflect that we are deleting voters instead of adding them, and running the dynamic programming over the voters already in the election instead of those that can be added. For most natural classes of scoring protocols, such as, e.g., the Borda rule, the assumptions of the above theorems hold. We have the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5 Plurality, veto, k-veto, k-approval and Borda are vulnerable to destructive AV and DV priced control.
As a side comment, we mention that for some rules there is an interesting connection between the complexity of DV-priced-control and the complexity of AV-priced-control. Indeed, for some rules such as Borda, Condorcet, or Copeland, we can reduce the former to the latter. Proof Let I DV be an instance of constructive (destructive) DV-priced-control with election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate c ∈ C, a list of prices associated with voters , and available budget K ∈ N. We reduce I DV to instance I AV of constructive (destructive) AV-priced-control, consisting of:
. the set of additional voters W which consists of the voters from V with their preference orders reversed, and 4. available budget K.
Further, the price of adding voter w ∈ W is the same as the price of deleting the voter v ∈ V (in I DV ) from which w was created.
To see why the reduction works, it suffices to make the following simple observation. Let v be some voter in V and let w be the corresponding voter from W . Consider some arbitrary candidates a and b. Since w's preference order is the reverse of that of v, the following holds: Theorem 4.6 is quite interesting since there are relatively few relations known between the complexities of various election-related problems. Some similar results were given by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] for the case of voter control under k-approval and k-veto, by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Menton [30] for the case of destructive control-by-partition problems, by Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [20] for a relation between manipulation and priced bribery, and by Elkind, Faliszewski, and Slinko [16] for the case of the possible winner problem and the swap bribery problem.
Resistance results
We will now show a scoring protocol whose entries are computable in polynomial time and for which both destructive priced control by adding voters and destructive priced control by deleting voters are NP-hard. By our previous results, we know that the entries of our scoring protocol cannot be polynomially bounded in the number of candidates.
We design our scoring protocol to facilitate an NP-hardness proof based on a reduction from the X3C (eXact 3 Cover) problem. X3C is a well-known NP-complete problem [28] . We are given a set X and a family S of three-element subsets of X. We ask if there is an exact cover of X using sets from S. Formally, we define the X3C problem as follows: Name: X3C Given: Nonempty set X = {0, . . . , 3k − 1}, family S = {S 1 , . . . , S n } of three-element subsets of X. Question: Is there I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} such that I = k and i∈I S i = X?
We now move on to defining our scoring protocol. For a given positive integer n and three integers 0 ≤ x < y < z < n, let f n (x, y, z) be the number of 3-element subsequences of n − 1, . . . , 0 that are greater or equal to z, y, x in lexicographical order. For example, if we consider all 3-element subsequences of 5, . . . , 0 , the greatest tuple in lexicographical order is 5, 4, 3 , therefore f 6 (3, 4, 5) = 1. On the other hand 2, 1, 0 is the least subsequence and we have that f 6 (0, 1, 2) = that α f 3k (a,b,c) > α f 3k (x,y,z) . Therefore, indeed, scoring vectors in the SP H protocol are defined properly. Before presenting our main resistance results of this section, we give some intuition regarding SP H scoring protocol in the following example. Proof SP H is clearly susceptible to AV control. To show NP-hardness we give a reduction from X3C. Let (X, S) be an X3C instance, where X = {0, . . . , 3k − 1} and S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }. We assume that k < n < 
3. The set W of additional voters consists of one additional vote w i for each set S i in S. In vote w i , candidate d is least preferred and candidate p is placed in such a way that the addition of w i to the election increases p's score by j ∈S i m j (e.g., if S i = {7, 9, 13} then candidate p is placed in position f 3k (7, 9, 13) ). The remaining candidates are placed arbitrarily in the vote. The cost of adding w i is equal to j ∈S i m j .
4. The total available budget K is equal to 3k−1 i=0 m i . In election E = (C, V ), prior to adding any of the voters from W , the candidates have the following scores:
Candidate d is the unique winner of this election with score advantage of 3k−1 i=0 m i (equal to the available budget K) over the candidate p, and score advantage of more than n(m 3k−1 + m 3k−2 + m 3k−3 ) over the candidates in B. To see why this is the case, note that for each b i ∈ B it holds that (recall that m ≥ 3):
If the input X3C instance has a solution, then adding votes from W that correspond to the sets S i that constitute an exact cover of X increases the score of candidate p by K and requires budget of K. The score of the despised candidate d remains the same and destructive control is successful.
For the reverse direction, if control is possible then it must be a result of a tie between d and p. This is so because the scores of candidates from B can be increased by no more than n(m 3k−1 + m 3k−2 + m 3k−3 ), which is not sufficient to tie or beat d. Moreover, the score of candidate p must be increased by at least diff E (d, p) = K, and by no more than the available budget K. Thus the sets S i that correspond to the added voters must form an exact cover of X (recall the second property from Example 4.8).
Destructive priced control by deleting voters also is NP-hard for our scoring rule.
Theorem 4.10 SP H is resistant to destructive DV-priced-control.
Proof We give a reduction from X3C. Let (X, S) be an X3C instance, where X = {0, . . . , 3k − 1}, and S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }. We assume that k < n < If input X3C instance has a solution, then deleting votes from V of type (33e) that correspond to sets S i that constitute an exact cover of X decreases the score of d by K and requires a budget of K. The score of candidate p is unchanged and, thus, p and d tie and so destructive control is successful.
In the other direction, if control is possible it must be a result of a tie between d and p. This is so due to the existing score differences between the candidates in B and d, the fact that only voters of type (33e) can be deleted, and their prices. The score of candidate d must be therefore decreased by at least K to ensure that d ties or loses with p. But at the same time it cannot be decreased by more than K because the introduced score difference between d and p is equal to the price of the control action. Thus the total price must be exactly K and the deleted voters directly correspond to sets S i constituting an exact cover of X.
We believe that the above results are quite intriguing. While our scoring protocol SP H is not likely to be used in any real-life election, it is not completely unnatural either. It is interesting if one can show that destructive control by adding/deleting voters is NP-hard for scoring vectors of the form 2 m−1 , 2 m−2 , . . . , 2 1 , 2 0 . We leave this as an interesting open problem.
Summary
In this work we examined the computational complexity of election control for the case where different control actions (such as adding/deleting different candidates or voters) may come at different prices. We argued that such problems are useful ways of modeling problems that arise in planning political campaigns.
We examined the plurality, approval, Condorcet, and Copeland rules and we have shown that introducing prices does not affect the complexity of control problems for these rules. On the other hand, we have shown that there are scoring protocols for which unpriced destructive control is polynomial-time solvable, but for which introducing prices moves the problem to be NP-hard. This is quite interesting when we compare the complexity of priced control with the complexity of unpriced control for weighted elections. For the latter, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] show that destructive voter control is polynomial-time solvable for all scoring protocols, whereas we show a scoring protocol for which priced destructive voter control is NP-hard. This is interesting because in the bribery setting (which is relatively similar to the control setting) adding prices has a smaller impact on the complexity of the problem than adding weights. While one might have expected the same behavior for the case of control, we show that this is not the case. One possible reason for this difference between the complexity of the weighted and the priced variants of control is due to a subtle difference in the interpretation of their input. For example, the input for weighted voter control problems contains the total number of voters that can be added/deleted and this number can always be seen as encoded in unary. Instead, in priced control problems the input contains the budget that we can spend on adding/deleting voters. In our hardness proofs we rely on this budget being encoded in binary. (Yet, we should mention that the same input-interpretation issue applies to the bribery setting.)
Our work opens several interesting research directions. For example, one could seek if there are natural voting rules for which introducing prices increases the complexity of control problems. It is also interesting to consider the complexity of priced control in restricted domains, such as the single-peaked domain or the single-crossing domain. Another potential research direction is to consider approximation algorithms for the priced control problems.
